TAŞDEMİR v. TURKEY
SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 52538/09
Bayram TAŞDEMİR and others
against Turkey
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 12 March 2019 as a Chamber composed of:
Robert Spano, President,
Paul Lemmens,
Işıl Karakaş,
Julia Laffranque,
Valeriu Griţco,
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,
Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 18 September 2009,
Having regard to the declaration submitted by the respondent Government on 23 January 2018 requesting the Court to strike the application out of the list of cases and the applicants’ reply to that declaration,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
1. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix.
2. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.
3. The first two applicants’ son and the remaining applicants’ sibling İlkay Taşdemir lost his life on 6 August 2002 after having fallen from a window on the fourth floor of the Gayrettepe police station in Istanbul where he had been taken after his arrest. A complaint made by the applicants to the prosecutor, namely that their relative had been ill-treated and killed, was rejected by a prosecutor who considered that the relative had taken his own life. Subsequently, a number of police officers were put on trial for having neglected their duties by failing to stop the applicants’ relative from committing suicide. They were acquitted on the grounds of lack of sufficient evidence. While the examination of the appeal lodged by the applicants against the police officers’ acquittal was pending before the Court of Cassation, the criminal proceedings became time-barred and were discontinued.
4. Disciplinary proceedings were also conducted in respect of the relevant police officers within the scope of the incident. At the end of the investigation the police officers were found to have committed the disciplinary offence of, inter alia, negligence in the assessment and performance of their duties and were subjected to a penalty of short term suspension of their rights for a period of six months.
5. The application had been communicated to the Government.
THE LAW
6. The applicants complained under Article, inter alia, 2 of the Convention that the authorities of the respondent State had acted negligently and had therefore failed to protect the right to life of their relative.
7. After the failure of attempts to reach a friendly settlement, by a letter of 23 January 2018 the Government informed the Court that they proposed to make a unilateral declaration with a view to resolving the issue raised by the application. They further requested the Court to strike out the application in accordance with Article 37 of the Convention.
The declaration provided as follows:
“The Government regret the occurrence of individual cases of death in police custody caused by failures to protect life, as in the circumstances of the present case, notwithstanding existing Turkish legislation and the resolve of the Government to prevent such failures.
The Government admit that the death of the applicants’ relative resulting from the failure to provide protective measures and the judicial proceedings concerning the death did not meet the standards enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention. The Government undertake to adopt all necessary measures to ensure that the right to life – including the obligation to conduct such proceedings effectively – is respected in the future.
The Government of Turkey declare that they offer to pay jointly to the applicants Sevim Taşdemir, Bayram Taşdemir, İlknur Taşdemir, Turgay Taşdemir, Tuncay Taşdemir, Turgut Taşdemir and Umut Taşdemir, with a view to securing an unilateral declaration of the above-mentioned case pending before the European Court of Human Rights, EUR 20,000 (twenty thousand euros) to cover any and all non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.
These sums will be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable on the date of payment, and will be payable within three months from the date of notification of the decision taken by the Court to strike the case out of its list of cases. In the event of failure to pay these sums within the said three-month period, the Government undertake to pay simple interest on them, from expiry of that period until settlement, at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. The payment will constitute the final resolution of the case.”
8. By a letter of 7 March 2018, the applicants indicated that they were not satisfied with the terms of the unilateral declaration on the ground that similar violations were still taking place at police stations in Turkey where suspects were being detained and that no measures were being taken to prevent them and that the judicial and administrative response to such incidents was unsatisfactory.
9. The Court reiterates that Article 37 of the Convention provides that it may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to one of the conclusions specified, under (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 1 of that Article. Article 37 § 1 (c) enables the Court in particular to strike a case out of its list if:
“for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application”.
10. It also reiterates that in certain circumstances, it may strike out an application under Article 37 § 1 (c) on the basis of a unilateral declaration by a respondent Government even if the applicants wish the examination of the case to be continued.
11. To this end, the Court has examined the declaration in the light of the principles emerging from its case-law, in particular the Tahsin Acar judgment (Tahsin Acar v. Turkey (preliminary issue) [GC], no. 26307/95, §§ 75-77, ECHR 2003-VI; see also Jeronovičs v. Latvia [GC], no. 44898/10, 5 July 2016).
12. The Court notes that the subject matter of the present application concerns, firstly, the Member States’ positive obligation to take steps to protect the right to life (see L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, § 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑III). Specifically relevant to the subject matter of the present application, in a number of its judgments the Court has examined allegations of failures to protect the right to life of detainees in Turkey (see, inter alia, Kılavuz v. Turkey, no. 8327/03, §§ 87-97, 21 October 2008; and Çoşelav v. Turkey, no. 1413/07, § 53, 9 October 2012). Secondly, the case concerns the obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to carry out effective investigations (see, inter alia, Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014/05, § 169, 14 April 2015 and the case cited therein).
13. In this connection the Court reiterates that, in cases concerning persons who have disappeared or have been killed by unknown perpetrators and where there is prima facie evidence in the case file supporting allegations that the domestic investigation fell short of what is necessary under the Convention, a unilateral declaration should contain an admission to that effect, combined with an undertaking by the respondent Government to conduct an investigation that is in full compliance with the requirements of the Convention as defined by the Court in previous similar cases (see Tahsin Acar, cited above, § 84 and the cases cited therein). Indeed, the Court has rejected to entertain unilateral declarations submitted by the respondent Governments in cases in which there were no such undertakings to reopen the investigations, on the ground that respect for human rights required that the examination of the case be pursued pursuant to the final sentence of Article 37 § 1 of the Convention (see Mishina v. Russia, no. 30204/08, §§ 23-30, 3 October 2017 and the cases cited therein; see also, mutatis mutandis, Toğcu v. Turkey, no. 27601/95, §§ 10‑14, 31 May 2005).
14. The Court accepts that there may be situations where it is de jure or de facto impossible to reopen criminal investigations into the incidents giving rise to the applications being examined by the Court. Such situations may arise, for example, in cases in which the alleged perpetrators were acquitted and cannot be put on trial for the same offence, or in cases in which the criminal proceedings became time-barred on account of the statute of limitations set out in the national legislation. Indeed, a re-opening of criminal proceedings which had been terminated on account of the expiry of the statute of limitations, may raise issues concerning legal certainty (see Coëme and Others v. Belgium, nos. 32492/96 and 4 others, § 145, ECHR 2000‑VII) and may thus have a bearing on a defendant’s rights under Article 7 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Kononov v. Latvia [GC], no. 36376/04, §§ 228-233, ECHR 2010). In a similar vein, putting the same defendant on trial for an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted may raise issues concerning that defendant’s right not to be tried or punished twice, within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention (see Marguš v. Croatia [GC], no. 4455/10, § 114, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).
15. In addition to the examples of de jure impossibilities mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Court also cannot overlook the possibility that if a long time has passed since the incident had taken place, evidence might have disappeared, been destroyed or become untraceable and it may therefore in practice no longer be possible to reopen an investigation and conduct it in an effective fashion.
16. Thus, whether a Member State is under an obligation to reopen criminal proceedings, and consequently whether a unilateral declaration should contain such an undertaking, would depend on the specific circumstances of the case, including the nature and the seriousness of the alleged violation, the identity of the alleged perpetrator, whether other persons not involved in the proceedings may have been implicated, the reason why the criminal proceedings have been terminated, the shortcomings and any defects in the criminal proceedings preceding the decision to bring the criminal proceedings to an end, and whether the alleged perpetrator contributed to the shortcomings and defects that led to the criminal proceedings being brought to an end.
17. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that, although the unilateral declaration contains an express acknowledgment by the Government that the death of the applicants’ relative had resulted from the failure to provide protective measures and that the judicial proceedings concerning the death had not met the standards enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention, it does not contain any undertakings by the Government to reopen the investigation into the death. The question therefore remains as to whether, in the light of the absence of such an undertaking, the Court can entertain the Government’s unilateral declaration.
18. The Court observes that the criminal proceedings introduced against the police officers for having neglected their duties by failing to stop the applicants’ relative from committing suicide became time-barred and were discontinued (see paragraph 3 above). It is therefore de jure impossible, under Turkish law, to reopen a criminal investigation into the death of the applicants’ relative. Moreover, there is no allegation that other individuals had also been involved in the death of the applicants’ relative.
19. The Court notes that a de jure impossibility to reopen proceedings in cases concerning complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention is not, in principle, an impediment for the Committee of Ministers to close its examinations under Article 46 of the Convention. For example, following the Grand Chamber’s finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its procedural aspect in the above-mentioned case of Jeronovičs, the applicant requested the national prosecutor to reopen the investigation into his allegations. His request was rejected on account of the expiry of the statute of limitations. In its Resolution concerning the Grand Chamber’s judgment the Committee of Ministers considered that all the measures required by Article 46 § 1 of the Convention had been adopted, and decided to close its examination (see Resolution CM/ResDH(2017)312).
20. Having regard to the Government’s above-mentioned acknowledgment of responsibility, the disciplinary punishment imposed on the police officers (see paragraph 4 above) and the amount of compensation proposed by the Government in their unilateral declaration, namely 20,000 euros, coupled with the clear and extensive case‑law on the topic referred to above (see paragraph 12), the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 (c)). The Court stresses that its decision is without prejudice to the possibility for the applicant to exercise any other available remedies in order to obtain redress (see Jeronovičs v. Latvia (dec.), no. 547/02, § 54, 10 February 2009, and, mutatis mutandis, Jeronovičs, cited above, §§ 116‑118).
21. As it has done in the above-mentioned judgment in the case of Jeronovičs (ibid, § 117), the Court deems it important to stress that the unilateral declaration procedure is an exceptional one. As such, when it comes to breaches of the most fundamental rights contained in the Convention, it is not intended either to circumvent the applicant’s opposition to a friendly settlement or to allow the Government to escape their responsibility for such breaches. In the present case, the Court has examined all the circumstances surrounding the death of the applicants’ relative and the ensuing criminal proceedings into the death in the light of the clear and extensive case-law on the topic mentioned above (see paragraph 12).
22. In light of the above considerations, and in particular given the clear and extensive case-law on the topic referred to above, the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 in fine). In particular, the Court considers that the nature and extent of the obligations arising under the Convention for the respondent State in cases of alleged failures to protect the right to life of detainees have already been specified in a number of its judgments (see, mutatis mutandis, Tahsin Acar, cited above, § 81). Furthermore, the said prevailing issues in Turkey have also sufficiently been brought to the attention of the Committee of Ministers and they are being followed up under the terms of Article 46 § 2 of the Convention.
23. Finally, the Court emphasises that, should the Government fail to comply with the terms of their unilateral declaration, the application could be restored to the list in accordance with Article 37 § 2 of the Convention (Josipović v. Serbia (dec.), no. 18369/07, 4 March 2008).
24. In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike the case out of the list.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Takes note of the terms of the respondent Government’s declaration under Article 2 of the Convention and of the modalities for ensuring compliance with the undertakings referred to therein;
Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases in accordance with Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention.
Done in English and notified in writing on 4 April 2019.
Stanley NaismithRobert Spano
RegistrarPresident
Appendix
No.
Firstname LASTNAME
Birth year
Nationality
Place of residence
Representative
Bayram TAŞDEMİR
1946
Turkish
TEKİRDAĞ
G. Tuncer
Sevim TAŞDEMİR
1963
Turkish
TEKİRDAĞ
G. Tuncer
İlknur TAŞDEMİR
1980
Turkish
TEKİRDAĞ
G. Tuncer
Tuncay TAŞDEMİR
1984
Turkish
TEKİRDAĞ
G. Tuncer
Turgay TAŞDEMİR
1986
Turkish
TEKİRDAĞ
G. Tuncer
Turgut TAŞDEMİR
1991
Turkish
TEKİRDAĞ
G. Tuncer
Umut TAŞDEMİR
1996
Turkish
TEKİRDAĞ
G. Tuncer
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy