KYRIYENKO v. UKRAINE

 
 
FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 17967/09
Mariya Mykhaylivna KYRIYENKO
against Ukraine
 
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 28 May 2019 as a Committee composed of:
Yonko Grozev, President,
Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,
Lado Chanturia, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 March 2009,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1.  The applicant, Ms Mariya Mykhaylivna Kyriyenko, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1958 and lives in Stari Petrivtsi. She was represented before the Court by Mr Y.L. Boychenko, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg.
2.  The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna.
A.  The circumstances of the case
3.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4.  The applicant instituted civil proceedings against her sister and mother, claiming that she had a right to half of the house given that she had contributed to its construction; however, the ownership title had initially been issued in the name of the applicant’s mother, who had been given the plot of land by the authorities. Later, in 1994 and 2003, the applicant’s mother had gifted, respectively, 3/5 and 2/5 of the house to the applicant’s sister. The applicant submitted that she had, in fact, financed the construction of half of the house and on those grounds she could claim ownership of half of the house. The applicant produced receipts for the purchase of construction materials and called witnesses in support of her claims. The applicant challenged only the second gift act, in relation to 2/5 of the house.
5.  On 25 June 2008 the Vyshgorod District Court of Kyiv Region dismissed the applicant’s claim as unfounded, after examining the parties’ submissions and the witness statements. The court, having mentioned general provisions of section 17 of the Property Act regarding common property (see below), noted however that the construction of the house had been governed by different rules which established the procedures for issuing a building permit to a particular person, putting the newly‑constructed house into operation and registering the new property with the technical inventory agency. Given these peculiarities, the court reasoned that, in order to claim property rights over a certain part of the house, the applicant, above all, had to show that there had been an agreement between her mother, who had acted as developer of the land plot before the authorities, and other possible participants in the construction process. Provided that such an agreement were proved to exist, the applicant then had to submit evidence of her contribution to the construction of the house. Applying those legal conditions, the court stated that the relevant facts had not been established during the trial. Notably, there had been no agreement between the parties to own the house as common property, the receipts produced by the applicant did not indicate any name and the defendants disputed that it had been the applicant who had paid the relevant bills.
6.  As regards the validity of the 2003 gift act in relation to the transfer of 2/5 of the house from the applicant’s mother to her sister, the court found that this claim had likewise been groundless, given that the applicant’s mother had been the lawful owner of that part of the house. The court further noted that there had been grounds to apply the limitation period and declare the applicant’s claim time-barred; however, in the present case the applicant had failed even to establish that she had had any legitimate property right in respect of which the limitation period could have expired.
7.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the first-instance court had established the facts wrongly and made mistakes in applying the domestic law. She argued that, in its decision, the first-instance court had not elaborated on the witness statements.
8.  On 20 October 2008 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, reiterating that the construction of the house had been covered by a special legal regime under which the applicant had to show that there had been specific agreement between the parties on the creation of common ownership of the house. Having assessed the file, the appellate court considered that there had been no such evidence of any agreement between the parties. Likewise, there had been no grounds to invalidate the 2003 gift act.
9.  On 8 December 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal, considering that the imputed court decisions were lawful and substantiated.
B.  Relevant domestic law and practice
Property Act, 7 February 1991 (repealed by the Act of 27 April 2007)
10.  The Property Act provided that property acquired by means of common labour of family members was treated as common, joint property of the family members, unless they had agreed otherwise in writing (section 17 § 1). Property acquired by means of common labour of citizens who had united for that purpose was treated as common shared property of those citizens, unless they had agreed otherwise in writing (section 17 § 2).
COMPLAINT
11.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the domestic courts refused her civil claim without providing appropriate reasons.
THE LAW
12.  The applicant complained that the domestic courts failed to deal with important factual and legal aspects of her civil case which resulted in a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
13.  Article 6 § 1 reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A.  The parties’ submissions
14.  The applicant insisted that the domestic courts had misinterpreted domestic law and had failed to establish all the facts and give due consideration to the witness statements which could confirm the relevant facts.
15.  The Government maintained that the domestic courts provided sufficient and adequate reasoning for their findings. Notably, they explained why section 17 of the Property Act was inapplicable and why it could not serve as a basis for the applicant’s claims. Then, exercising judicial economy, the courts did not set out in detail in their decisions the content of the evidence provided by the applicant’s witnesses, which added nothing to the question of whether or not there had been an agreement between the parties on common ownership of the house. Moreover, the first‑instance court, in its decision, specified that the claim could also be dismissed as time-barred.
B.  The Court’s assessment
16.  The Court reiterates that, according to its long-standing and established case-law, the Court should not act as a court of fourth instance and will not therefore question under Article 6 § 1 the judgment of the national courts, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 61, ECHR 2015, with further references).
17.  Article 6 § 1 obliges the domestic courts to give reasons for their judgments. This duty cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument and the question of compliance with that duty can only be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case (see Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 9 December 1994, § 29, Series A no. 303‑A and García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 26, ECHR 1999‑I). These principles have been applied in a number of Ukrainian cases (see, for example, Benderskiy v. Ukraine, no. 22750/02, §§ 42-47, 15 November 2007; Pronina v. Ukraine, no. 63566/00, § 25, 18 July 2006; Bogatova v. Ukraine, no. 5231/04, §§ 18 and 19, 7 October 2010).
18.  In the present case the applicant was in dispute with her mother and sister as regards the ownership of half of the house. The domestic courts had carefully examined the claims and explained in their decisions under which specific legal conditions the applicant could assert her right of joint ownership in the newly-constructed property. The courts gave their interpretation of the domestic law and indicated, in particular, why section 17 of the Property Act, providing general principles on acquisition of common property, could not apply. In that regard the courts reasoned that construction of a house fell under the different legal rules specifically governing the relevant procedures (see paragraphs 5 and 8 above). Such interpretation of domestic law was not arbitrary or devoid of any substance. The courts further found that the applicant had not proved that she had satisfied the conditions under which she could claim property rights and suggested in any event that the claim could be dismissed as time-barred. It does not appear that, in reaching those conclusions, the domestic courts failed to examine any evidence or made any unreasonable assessment of the evidence which could distort the facts of the case. Even though the applicant’s witnesses were expressly mentioned only in the decision of the first-instance court, the Court would reiterate that the obligation of the domestic courts under Article 6 § 1 to give reasons for their decisions does not require a detailed answer to each and every argument. Given the circumstances, nothing suggests that the courts had to elaborate on those statements in more detail in their decisions.
19.  In sum, the Court cannot find that the domestic courts’ decisions were arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable or that any key argument raised by the applicant had remained unanswered. It follows that her complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 20 June 2019.
Milan BlaškoYonko Grozev
Deputy RegistrarPresident

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